Common Features And Contrasts In Labor Relations In The Semiarid Tropics Of India by Binswanger, H P et al.

e @ 8 +  
A Pr~l~lic;l~ioji  of' the Fconomic Ciro\\th ('rnrcr. 'r'nlc 1ni\t3rcit\ 
CONI'KAC'1'IJAL AKR ANGEh.1 EN'I'S. 
EMI'L.0Y M EN'I-, A N D  WAG13 
I N  R U R A L  LABOR MAKKEI'S IN ASIA 
l ~ l ) l l ' l : [ )  Ill' 
l 1ANS 1'. 13INS\VAN(il:R A N D  M A R K  I< 
KOS1:NZW 
'r'alc U~rivcrsity I'ress New Haven and L.ontlon 
Vehicle? Waitin8 in the Factory Compound on 2/1/1977 
A t  the beginning of the 1st rhin (04CN)hrt) 
At the kginnine nf the 2nd *hift f l m h n )  
At the heginnin~ of the 3rd shin (2MW) hrs) 
Once begun. the harvesting goes on continuously for an average of a 
little over five months. The factory itself stays in operation rorrnd the clock : 
there is a few hours' pause in the deliveries only  in the early morning. 'I he 
rhythm of work is regulated purely according to the milling cnp:~city of thc 
factory. There is absolutely no question of free time or days off. This con- 
tinuous production process is brought to a standstill only in  order to clean 
the factory one (fay every fortnight and no work is done that  day for that 
reason alone. 
As already explained, the harvest is performed accorditrg to a tightl) 
~ r i t t en  scenario. 'The job of the work gangs is to see that tliere is al\c;r!s 
enough cane cut and ready for transporting: however. i t  nltrst be cartctf 
oTf within a few hours of being cut to avoid an excessive drop in the srlcrosc 
content. Nevcrthelcss. thc prcxess frequently comcs to a stan(fstill bccauqc 
of the congestion in deliveries at the factory, electricity cuts, I~reakdown of 
rnachincry or lorries, and other unforeseen but regularly occurring mishap$ 
'I hese setbacks demand a great capacity for improvisation rtliionpl the field 
staff', hut it is the workers who actually suffer from this enforced flexibiiits. 
All the risks involved in the cutting and transporting are passed on to hc 
borne hy them. Whcnever production is dcliiymi or the prcdnction line 
hrokcn, cutting is n t  once halted. The labor contract rnadc with tlic r~rrrkntkr~~rv 
iricludes a clause stating that the factory accepts no liability \vhatscw\cr 
for loss of wnges resulting from these interruptions in the ctirily work. 'I he 
factory not only allows generous margins in the utilizatioti of the canc- 
cutting work force without paying any extra. but so regulatr.~ the liarvr~t 
that losses arising out of work stoppage fall on the workers ;rlone. 1 hc in- 
terest of rhe f:lctory is set above the interests of all others i111d itnplies nti  
urrlimitcd slltrscrvience on the part of thc labor force. 
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'I he niaitt ohjcctivcs of this paper are ( I )  to document and explain labor 
market arranpcnients in tlifl'ercnt agroclimatic and socicwonomic zones on 
the basis of intensive survey data; (2) to explore linkages of transactions in 
labor ninrkets \rith transactions in other mnrkets such as those for credit. 
dral't po\sfer, ant1 outpitt~. as well as linkages bctween caste status and type 
of labor perfornied: and ( 3 )  to characterize. i I S  far as possible. thc changes. 
i f  any, in labor relations over time. 
I'hc paper cornplc~ii~nts he papers by Jodha (chapter 5 )  and by Ryan 
and Ghodake (chapter 9) also presented in this volume. The villagcs and the 
regions, as well as the data gathering processes, are described in Jodha's 
paper, which focuses on tenancy relations. 'The Ryan. (ihodake papcr i s  a 
quantitativc asscssnient of lvages, opportunity cost of labor, and workinp 
hours of individuals w,ho participate in the daily labor marker. In this paper 
the focus i s  on the ins~itutional mechanisms in the daily market and on the 
milrkct for regular farm servants (RFSs).' In the first section wc discuss 
comnion featurcs of tl ie lahor markets studied. The second section focuses 
on difrercnces in lahor demand and income in the thrce study areas; the 
third i s  concerned with differences in markets for RFSs and contract workers. 
In the last section we interpret the evidence and put forth further hypothetes 
rcpnrdinp montlllsony I n h r  dcmnnd, intercnstc cornpclition. m:trket qcp- 
t iwnl~ttit~t~, ~ t t d  i~ttctlit~kcd t r i ~ t ~ ~ : t ~ I i f ~ n ~ ,  
Ilu411~l l~ l l t t I IKnl~ o t ~  nn r :~ r l y  tlin11 wetc made hy Isranah Hartthan, Marb W Wrt.*ln7wc1g, 
and Rcnjnmin White. thc ~~nprovcmcnlr made rime Ihit early vcrtion (*we much 11) them. 'l he 
sctistrncc of thc Intrrnati~~nat C'ropq Rrscarch Inttiturc for the Scmi-Arid 'Ircrpitr (IC'RISAT) 
in carryinp out !he work on which this paper i s  bawd i s  gratefully acknowkclgcll 
Suhmittcd ac conference paper no. 94 by the ln~crnatianrl Crgp Rcearch Inqritutc for t k  
Semi- Arid 7 ropics. 
I. We tiw the term "rrgular farm urvanr" (RFS) for any laborer uhou lahr contrad 
exceeds thrrr month* 
1 44 Dynnniirs and Rixidir I. in I ~ h l r  hlnrkr~.r 
The paper is based on several different types of data from the ICRISAT 
village-level studies as (VLS), as explained in table 8.1 (for details of the 
regions and villages, see chapter 5). The basic sample is the penel of 240 
households that have been interviewed monthly as part of the V t S  of the 
ICRISAT since May 1975. Panel interviews focusing on labor relations were 
conducted from May to August 1979 with metnbcrs of all farm-aim groups, 
but emphasis was given tocollection of information from RI:Ss. In addition, 
special informants were selected by four of the authors of this paper, who 
had resided in these villages for more than two years as investigators. The 
special informants were primarily asked questions about changes in labor 
relations over time. Even this information was insufiicient lo help us under- 
stand the rather special features of the Aurepalle labor market discussed 
in this paper. Therefore, in January and Febnlary of 1980 a three-caste 
census was carried out, from which a further random sample was chosen 
for the collection of information on wages and other data. Wc will refer to 
these data sources as necessary. 
COMMON FEATURES OF THE I.AROR MARKETS 
The labor markets in these six villages consist of several aubmarkets, as 
shown in flgure 8. I .  The irregular market is divided into a rtinrket for d~ily 
rated labor, where payment is made every day for a fixed number of hours 
worked; and a market for contract jobs, where farmers or n government 
agency (directly, or via contractors or labor brokers) give out work- - r l s t ~ ~ I I y  
on a piece-rate basis. Daily incomea from contract jobs are pencrally higher 
than from daily rated jobs, although contract jobs often require longer hours 
and/or more strenuous work. As opportunities arise, individuals change from 
the contract job market to the daily rated markets and vice versa. 
Access to contract jobs is gained via personal networks that may be 
caste related in some of the villages. Groups for harvesting work or earth- 
work, or groups of temporary migrants are o r p i z e d  by ni:~le leaders who 
sometimes have formed fairly stable groups with other h~trseholds. The 
femnles recruited into these groups are most often wivca o r  of hcr family 
members. Groups for hand weeding and paddy transplanting are most 
often organized by female lenders. 
From the interviews with the panel memhers and uith the sp in1  
informants, it wc~s clear that male-female differences play an important role 
in access to contract jobs almost everwhere. Caste appeared to play :i 
minor role in the Akola region and the Sholapur region, whereas castc tsar 
frequently nientioned as a basis of group formation in thc Mahbttbnng;~r 
area, especially in Aurtpalle. This was one of the reasons for organititlg 
the three-caste census and the random sample there. In the pr- of 
d9llmtin(( lhkt InfbFkrtlnrl W M @ f l l a  how dimctttlt It la to urttlercltnnd 

the impact of caste on access to labor opportunities, both beciruse informants 
are not always conscious of i t  and because they do not like to merition i t .  
Many other features of the villages indicate that our first irnpression con- 
cerning the lesser importance of caste in access to contr;tct jobs in the 
Maharashtra regions is correct, but a follow-up inquiry of the type made 
in Aurepalle is currently being carried out in order to trace even subtle 
influences that might still be present. 
In  contrast to the contract labor market, the most striking characteristic 
of the daily rated market for farm work is its essentially impersonal nature. 
In the evening employers and their RFSs or the wives of the RFSs will go 
to the workers' houses and invite them for work.' Although they may have 
preferences for certain workers, especially for jobs requiring certain skills, 
employers are willing to hire anyone capable of doing the job in this market. 
regardless of caste or other socioeconomic relationship, if  a preferred worker 
is not available. Similarly, workers are willing to work for any employer. 
One effect of this is that workers work for a large number of enlployers in 
the course of the year.3 (Answers to a question on this point range froni 
twenty employers per year to much higher numbers.) The dailv rated market. 
although less attractive than the market for contract jobs, at least appears 
to give everyone a chance to participate on nearly equal terrlis. 
A sccontl characteristics, which may stem from the iri~personality of 
relationships in this market, is that a daily rated worker cannot untler fitly 
circr~mstances pet a loan or an advance from an employer or1 the basis of n 
promise that he will work for him in a peak period whcnevcr needed. 7 hi$ 
is in contrast to findings of Bardhan and Rudra (1978) in eastern Indin. 
Without collateral, workers can only obtain loans (interest-bearing d e h ~ )  
or advances (noninterest-bearing debt) from enlployers by entering into a 
RSF relationship for a minimum of three months in Akola or for a minimurn 
of one year in all other areas. In all these areas, it is nearly impossible for 
landless laborers to obtain loans from farmcrs or moneylcnders4 without 
other collateral such as sheep and goats, gold, and utensils, or regular 
2. Workers gencrally do not go and ask farmers for work. Only in Sliolapur do some of 
them do so ~ h c n  wry few work opporlunities are available. I t  stcms that asking for work 
puts one in a vcry poor bargainin8 position. 
3. Obviously, i t  i s  posqiblc for both fnrmcrs and lithorcrq to nvoitl p:~rtr~rrs whom they 
consiiicr inappropriate bccsuse of relative caste status: hiphtastc workers arc not ucuallv 
expected to afork for vcry low-caste landholders. 
4. They can occasion~lly get small loans in the neighborhood of RF 5 - 10 from shop. 
keepers, farmcrs, or friends. But any amount in excess of rouehly Rs 20- W rquires collateral 
in the form of long-term labor, or assets, or regular income. Also. in Sholnpur some farmerr 
will occasionally accept repayment of a small loan in thc form of work if t l ic  h~rrowcr cannot 
repay in cash and i f  the fanner requim labor. But such an agreement i s  neccr made when the 
loan i s  given. 
income from activities such ns toddy tappin#. 'The cotiscqucnce of this. 
as we shall sec, i s  that a primary motive for entering an R1-S arrangement 
i s  the possibility of salary advance or loans. 
Third. we did not observe tenants or their fnmily mcmhcrs providing 
labor to their lanttlord's farm on a preferential basis, in cither the regular 
or the irregular market. Jodha (chapter 5). however. found 8 few poor 
landlords working rcgulerly for wages for their tenants in Sholapur as part 
of the terms of the cotitract. 
Fourth, with the exception of harvesting, agricultural daily rated tasks 
are sex specific. Males do plowing, female do transplanting and weeding. 
Even in harvesting and threshing, many operations (such as witino\i.it~g) 
are often done by t~iembers of one sex only. However, t here are some regiolial 
variations in the S C S U ~ ~ ~ .  division of labor. The regular suhmarket i s  clcurly 
divided between tnalcs atid fetiiales. In  the whole inquiry we  found (in the 
three-caste census) only one female working as an RFS, watchirig ficltls. 
Among the RFSs the plowmen are mostly adults between sixteen and thirty 
years of age. I lerdsmen are usually young boys often years or older. Watch- 
men may be eldcrly nien who are not strong enough for other work; they 
may also be boys. Domcstic servants arc fcmalcs or youtip boys. Outside 
sweeping i s  n one- or t\vo-hour job pcrforrned daily by fcmalcs, i~suiilly 
drawn from :my low caste. Womcn and KFSs from ex-untouchable castes 
are s t i l l  excluded from jobs inside thc home. 
In the rcgul:lr labor market, linkages with the employer other than via 
debt are unusual. Of  the ninety-eight RFS contracts signed by households 
in the panel, only three contracts were noted that stipulated that employers 
should provide bullocks to the RFS to work on the land of the RFS, and in 
a l l  thrcecontracts the bullock rental rate was to be dcductcd from the wapes 
of the RFS. With a few exceptiorls (in Aurepalle). RFS relationships do 
not constitute lone-term or complex pi~tron-client r~ la t ionsh i~s .~  'They nrc 
usually conlitled to thc labor and crctiitladvann contract. are onen of short 
duration. and usually do not involve othcr family members. As cat1 be seen 
from columns 3 and 4 of tables 8.2 and 8.3, families in all areas tend to put 
only one of their members in this relationship at a timc. The number of panel 
rnembcrs currently serving as an RFS exceeds the number of families having 
5 .  We did rjhwrtc a 5ingle rcry long-term rcla~ion~hip in Fhirapur in which r um worked 
rsan R 1.S for thirty-four years. for the 5ame farmer for whom his father hod pteviously worked 
for a total of more than thirty )cars. This worker hmily helonpd to Ihc carte of Mahars (ex- 
untouchables. common in Maharashtra where many of them hate b tc~me Buddhists) r h o u  
mupation has trnditicwally k c n  charactcri7cd h) *uch lonpterm rdntion5hips. This Mahar 
RFS clearly cnjv!ed higher wager and s~rperior statu* relative to otlier RFS* io  the same v/lln@e: 




such rncmbcrs by only 20 percent for all villages combined. Furthermore, 
tvc ditl not uncover a single case in the panel where one family scnds two or 
niore of its mcrnbers as an RFS to the same farmer. This appears to be a 
sensiblc arrangcrnent if the possibility of obtaining loans or advances is 
indeed a primary motivation: a family would presumably wish to multiply 
rather than to limit its number of potentially useful relationsliips if seeking 
access to loans or advances in this way. 
Mole children and elderly men usually work as herdsmen or watchmen; 
here thc credit motivation may not be as overriding. Also. a few RFSs 
believe that this kind of work is physically less demanding than the work 
available in thc irregular market. 
The regular market has very few full-time opportunities for women: 
such opportunities are reslricted to domestic work in wealtlly households. 
Womcn from ex-untouchable groups are excluded from this opportutlity 
as well. A large number of usually low-caste women do part-time work as 
outside sweepers, 
Since the Ki;S opportunities are restricted to males, women without 
personal assets such as land, jewels, or gold cannot usually r;lisc any loans 
that exceed trivial amounts. The fact that womcti are exclllded from the 
RFS market and often have access to contract jobs only \ia their mnlc 
family members may also explain the very large wage difTcrcrices and 
differences in probabilities of employment between ~nalcs and females 
observed in ttiesc villages by Ryan and tihodake (chapter 9). 
Thc last cotnmon feature is that attempts by farmers to collude to l i ~  
wages are conlrnon. Farmers in Dokur, Kanzara, and Kink ticda llnvc triccl 
to fix daily wogcs several times but have failed each time. IAiborcrs :Ire 
generally unconcerned about possible success of such at tempts. The laree 
yield or quality reductions caused by delays in agricultural operations such 
3s seeding, weeding, and harvesting appear to result in cotnpclilive pressures 
Dn the labor dcniand side that make collusion unsuccessful. 
I n  Shirapur farmers have tried to f ix  a (fairly widc) range of cash 
payments to RFSs. These ranges seem to respond to market conditions and 
sften are not adhered to by farmers. In contrast to this is thc irnpressively 
ruccessful fixing of salaries and conditions of RFSs in Aurepnlle discussed 
n detail below. 
DIFFERENCES IN OVERALL LAROR D E M A N D  A N D  I N ( ' 0 M E  
rhis section is n hrief discussion of differences in lahor dcmand Quanritativc 
.ellectians of tliese difTcrences are given in chapter 9. 
Per family with labor income (column 2. tahle 8.2), Aurcpalle has the 
owest labor income-only Rs 603 (table 8.4). The demand for agricultural 
abor has very large seasonal variations. On the AIfisols only one crop per 

ycar can be grown and irrigation facilities are limitcd to I2 percent of the 
total cropped area. Soils and rainfall patterns in Aurepallc and Dokur are 
similar, but the extent of irrigation in Dokur is much grcatcr (32 percent 
of total cropped area) and a substantial proportion of irrig;tted area is 
double-cropped, so that agricultural labor demand is both grcatcr and more 
evenly distributed in Dokur than in Aurepalle. Labor incomes pet pnrticip~t- 
ing panel family are 50 percent higher in Dokur than in Aurepi\lle. Neithcr 
of the two villages has other nearby sources of labor demand. such as an 
industrial center or government projects. Some families in Atlrcpalle send 
members as rickshaw pullers to Hyderabad (80 km away). brrt otherwise 
demand from Hyderabad for unskilled labor does not appeitr to reach 
this village. Dokur. which is farther away, is even less affected by urhan 
labor demand. From Dokur many unskilled laborers migrate tcmprnrily 
over long distances to government projects. but there is no srlch migra- 
tion from Aurepalle. This contrast will be discussed again in the following 
section. 
In the Sholapur district agricultural labor demand probably has as much 
seasonal variation RS in Aurepalle. On the most fertile soils only one crop i s  
grown, in the postmonsoon season with residual moisture. and irrigation 
amounts to only 9 percent of total cropped area. But nonagricultilral dcmand 
for unskilled or semiskilled labor comes from the city of Sholapur; which is, 
a center of the textile industry. In addition, the Maharashtra government 
operates several government projects within walking distance of the villages. 
The construction of percolation tanks meant to increase groundwater and 
initiated as a relief measure during the severe drought of the carly 1970s 
belongs to a longstanding tradition of publicly operated relicf projects. 
hfore recently, construction of a canal was begun that draws labor from 
Shirapur. Labor incomes per participating panel family are therefore as high 
in Shirapur as in Dokur. 
The Akola region is an assured rainfall zone that requires littlc irrigation. 
I t  i s  a highly commercialized area that has been growing cottoti as a nia.jor 
~ q s h  crop for ccnturics. Cotton requires large amounts of labor over ir f;rirly 
e~tendcil hnrvcstinp prim! thnt he~ins after the tnirjor f(wd crop, scvgh~~tn, 
Ir;ts hccn I~nrvc.stc(l. Noncrpricul~urnl tlctnr~ntl libr ~rttskillcd I:~lto~ colltes 
irltrrosl cxclusivclv I'I.OII~ ncar~rlry povcrtimcnt-opc.r:~tccl Inlttl i~nlrtr\vc~~~c*trl 01 
irripirtion projccts, which have been intensified since the mid-l WOs. More 
rcccntly, !Ire Elnploylncnt Gunrantee Program of Mi~haraslltra Sti~tc tnakcs 
work available in a systetnatic way during the period between the cotton 
harvest and the onset of the subsequent monsoon. For all these reasons 
labor demand is most steady in the Akola region and this demand is reflected 
in labor incomes of Rs 1.416 per participating household-more than double 
the household labor incomes in Aurepalle. 
I)lFFERENCI!S IN M A R K E T S  FOR R E O l J t A R  FARM S E R I ' A N T S  ASD 
CONTRAC'T W O R K E R S  
The difTerenccs in tlie extent and regtrlaritg of labor demand npycar to have 
a major ilnpact on thc nature nnd length of contracts entered into in the 
market for RFSs and on the market for contract jobs. 
Akola District 
In Akola virtt~nlly a11 wages for hired labor are paid in casli. Because of the 
high and steadv Inbclr demand, RFS contracts are for period of three to fise 
montlts bct\vrcn the onset of the monsoon and the beginning of the cotton 
hnrvest, at ~ . l i i c I~  rinle' workers prel'er to leave reg~~lar cniployment for 
harvesting work. The RFS contract period is the leanest season and also 
coincides with the Iiigh-demand period for plowmen. Of the twenty-four 
RFSs observetl i n  this region, only four had relationships that extended 
more than onc ycirr. One was a tractor driver, another was an RFS with a 
yearlycontrnct, and the other two worked for periods of three to five months 
in several succcssivc years. 
Table 8.4 coliipares wages paid to RFSs with what we call the Ryan- 
Ghodake monthly wage equivalent (see chapter 9). This is the average annual 
daily wagc in tlie irregular market multiplied by the probability of employ- 
ment. The table reveals that the RFS wages in Akola excecd the monthly 
daily wage equivalent hy up to 100 percent. Of the twenty-four RFSs. only 
nine were indebted to their employers. Of the nine cases of indchtedness, 
five were not loans hut advances on wages given without interest. Obviously. 
interest on advanccs may be hidden in other terms of the contract. Tlic 
interest rates charged on two of the loans were comparable lo those a money- 
lender would charge, namely. somewhere between one-quarter and one-half 
of the principal otcr n four- to five-month period. One of the advanccs 
appcarcd to inclildc eti even higher hiddcn or implicit intcrest rate, sincc 
Ihc wi~gc ratc uscd for p~ying hack the loanc was roughly one-half of thc 
nornl:rl ~notill~ly w;~pc. Ncctllctc to nay, at t11e cntl of the pymcnt prim1 
Ihc workcr lcl~ hi3 joh. 1\11 ninc losns or etlvnnccs wcrc Ialren lor ntarrisy,~ 
purposes. lnlctlit~king or Iahor and crctlit tranwclionc thcrcrorc wcmn to k 
limited in thesc villrlgcs tocases in which laborers or small farmcr3 work ofra 
marriage loan (or advance on salary) ovcr a period of' roughly t hrec ta five 
months, during which they are fed by the remaining members of their family. 
The smaller of the two Akola villages, Kinkheda, appears to be fairly 
self-suflicient in tertns of' labor and neither imports nor exports substanlial 
amounts of if daily. The larger village, Kanzara, has a labor surplus in all 
seasons except the harvesting season. Since the mid- 19608, when government 
projects started to become an important source of employment for the 
laborers and small fanners of Kanzara, one man of the biahar caste has 
become an important organizer of contract labor gangs for these projects. 
He organizes large gangs of laborers, preferably from his own village but 
also from other villages if necessary. For one project in 1978, Ilc drew together 
900 laborers with the help of organizers from other villages. Of the 900 
laborers, 400 came from Kanzara. 
On government projects families tend to work as a group and are paid 
on a piecework basis averaging out to Rs 7.00 or 8.00 per day. This implies 
that in this area, at least, females do not engage in such work on thcir own, 
but only as part of their families. In addition, workers on government 
projects can purchase highly subsidized food grains as a result of the Food 
for Work Program. 
The mukadom, as the labor organizer is called, supervises the work alone 
or, if there are large groups of laborers, with the help of additional super- 
visors. He is paid roughly twice a laborer's daily wages for sltpplying a group 
of thirty to fifty laborers and supervising them. tie may also certify to shop 
keepers that some people are working on a government program, after which 
the workerscan take small loans of Rs 10-20 from shopkeepers. I t  is assufncd 
that he gets some money from the shopkeeper for that service as well. Two 
women, as well as the mukadam, organize large gangs of female workers for 
weeding during the monsoon season. They only negotiate the wages with the 
landlords ant1 organize up to fifty women to work in n partic~~lar fnrmer's 
fields. They take twice a female worker's wages from the I:trn~er for thcir 
service. This is the only area in which we found a man organizing gangs of 
women laborers for a female-specific agriculturnl operation. 
The mukadam is well liked by the workers; hc was electcd to the village 
punc.ha)tat in the last two elections and was a member of the tolitkn-level 
pnnchnyut for a two-year term. He seems also to be well liked hy the farmers, 
although stnall farmers who require only srnall groups of' I:~borers dislike 
the fact that they have more trouble getting those workers because of his 
activities. 
A striking fea;ure of the area is that no consutnption Inatis are made 
at the beginning of the monsoon period to small farmers and landlcss 
laborers. At the most, some shopkeepers may advance Rs 10-20 worth of 
supplies, usually on an interest-free basis and to be repaid very quickly." 
I t  is our impreseion that the t h m -  to five-month labor contracts that cover 
the lean season are operating as a substitute for consumption loans. This 
impression is strengthened by the fact that the monthly wages are often 
not paid at the end of the month but arc given in small amounts of Rs 10-20 
every few days, with accounts kept of the amounts paid. Part of these wages 
6. Interest m y  (or m y  not), of wum, be hidden in the price in such circumstnnccs. 
i s  often given in kind but we have heard no cotnplaint that the account in^ 
price of whatever was given in kind was valued above the current market 
price. 
We Jitl not note nny ciiste-based patron-client arnlnpcmcnts. Sucli a 
system prohably existed in the past. Also, our observations may have been 
biased. as the Akola sample includes only two f:imilics from the lowest 
cnstcs. But 11ic f;iilure to observe such relationships i s  to hc expected kctuse 
of the generally open and unlinked nature of labor qarket transactions in 
Akola and tlic free way, for example, in which Iowesk c:iste people sit and 
converse with higher caste individuals. I 
Sholapur District 
In Sholapur tl ie mqority of wage payments are i t \  the form of cash. The 
RFS contracts are annual contracts (table 8.3). Individuals who cn r  were 
an RFS did this kind of work for an average of 7.5 yenrs but usually split 
this period among several employers. Cumntly there arc fewer RFSs in 
the Sholaprlr samplc than in Akola, or in Aurepalle and Dokur combined. 
In Shiraprlr in the late 1930s. an RFS could earn Rs JO/year in cnsh 
and three bags (n total of 330 kg) per year of sorghum. The rate in 1962 for 
one respondent was Rs 400 plus three bags of sorghum. In 1979 the range 
was Rs 500-75Olyear. plus the same three bags of sorghum. In the 1930s 
thcrc was ;In c~ptioniil system. in uhich payment ccwld k taken exclusively 
in ciish. One rcspondcl~t earned a flat rate of Rs IIX)[~car and workttl for 
sevcn years until he was married; the money went to hi$ father, who used 
it  for fnliiily ~iccds including the tilarriagc of the respotrdent's brother. In 
1979 there illso exists the option of working for cash wages but this i s  rarely 
taken. 
Tile bnsic ration of sorghum (230 kg/year or 28.5 kg!month) can provide 
an importiint part of the food needs of an average fntnily. We observed 
two or three caws where RFSs receive meals for themselvc(i instead of grain, 
but such ci~ses are rare in Shirapur. tfowever. they are more frequent in 
Kalman, in ttie sanie district. Wages in kind are less important therc and 
are often provided in the form of meals rather than grain. 
Shirapur, as already noted, i s  an exceedingly drought-prone village. 
The importance of receiving wages in kind is  evident. I t  i s  not surprisine. 
then, that the basic food grain component of the RFS wage has remained 
essentially constant over at least the last forty years while the cash component 
has been driven up by inflation. Workers demand basic seclurity in return 
for their contract, but employers are unwilling, in a scarcity zone, to assume 
risks beyond those represented by this level of kind payments. 
Several respondents noted that during the drought period beginning 
in 1972, many RFSs were laid off; the claim of RFSs on their employers 
evidently does not extend to being carried through periods of prolonged 
scarcity. I t  is an open question whether this readiness to dismiss RFSs during 
period of great stress is increased by the existence of the drought relief 
projects discussed in the last section. Most respondents reported that the 
number of RF7Ss has declined substantially relative to the prc-1972 period: 
they ascribe this to the continued availability of employment opportunities 
from government projects. 
The possibility of obtaining the cash portion of the wage as an irirerr.vr- 
j iee advance continues to be a major motivation lor entrring the RFS 
relationships, and many of these advances are taken for marriage purposes. 
Usually the cash portion of the wage is given in two or tllrcc installmentc 
but thc advances can be up to the full year's cash portion. Sonle respondents 
reported that before 1972 i t  was possible for an RFS to obtain Inore than one 
year's cash portion in advance but such transactions are no longer observed. 
The cash equivalent of total wages varies from Rs 75 to 105 and. as ill 
Akola, exceeds the Ryan-Ghodake monthly wageequivalent by a substantial 
margin. 
Contract jobs are given only for harvesting. Labor supply for other agri- 
cultural operations-- once they are started-- is assured by  not her region- 
specific feature. I f  laborers are hired on the first day of a given operation 
(hand weeding, for example), they will work for several days fbr thc some 
farmer until completion of the operation, urlless sickness or nark on their 
own farms prevents them from doing so. F;lrmers will stop the work only 
if' forced to do so by weather conditions or lack of funds. During the elitire 
operation, daily wages set on the first day are not renegotintc<i. regardlcsc 
of what happens to market wageselsewhere in the village. This systcm enables 
farmers to estimatecosts at the beginning of at1 opcri~tion early as accilrately 
as if they were using contracts. 
Groups for government contract jobs are much smnllcr in Shirapur 
than in Kanznra and are less formally organized. Although. as elsewhere. 
they are always organized by males, the groups do include rc~ilales who arc 
not related to the male members and are hired as required. l'hc network that 
do operatc in these situations may be relatively unstrtlcturtul. or they may 
be influenced by such phenomena as caste. 
Mahbubnagar District: Aurepalle 
The hired labor market in Aurepalle has a number of unique charncteristics, 
many of which are linked to the caste system. Virtually all wngcs are paid 
in kind. The data on labor market participation (table 8.5) indicate that 
none of the members of the first two caste ranks in this village participates 
in the market for hired labor, whereas in Dokur (in the salnc district), 
members from all caste ranks participate. The RFSs are almost exclusively 
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TABLE 8.5. Caste Rank and Labor Market Participation, 19i6 77 
Aurepalle 6(6)' 9(9) 2(2) R(I0) O(2) I(:) 019) 2 6 ( W  
Dokar 6(6) 2(2) 4(4) 12(12) S(S) 2 ( 2 )  6 ( 9 )  !7(40) 
Shirnpur 4(4)  l(1) 9(9) ! ( I )  I(!) 2 ( : )  22 (? ! )  10($0) 
Kalnian ? ( ? I  1(1) P(R) ?(?) 2(J) t IR(2I) , !(J9) 
Krnparn I ( ! )  R(8) 3(f) I ( ! )  2(?) 14(17) 6tR) J5(40) 
Kinkhcda l(1) ( 3  2(4) R(R) 8(9) O(!) 12(11) JJ(40) 
h 'o~r ;  To derite thcse ranks the muthon. who were resident for n time in each t i l lap.  
rnnktd the csstcs npprnring among their regular VLS reqpondentr on the basis of pneral 
(stxinl) status. The ranks for tach carte were then reassigned. assuming for mn\vnience a 
possibility of onl! 7 disti,ncl r ~ n k s  in any \illage. The number of castes actually encounlcrd 
in each sample rangcd from 8 to 12. 
7 is the lo\vest rank. I is the highest. 
'The first fig~lre in each pair is the number of households in a given caste rank that reported 
ony amount of paid or exchange labor participation by any family member during the p e r  
1976 77. Thc figure in parentheses is the total numkr  o f  houxholds af'thnl rank in the mmple. 
recruited from the two lowest caste groups, which is not true in the other 
regions. 
That castc is indeed a major factor in controlling rtic~lcs' access to lahor 
opportuni~ies (except for the daily rated market) is confirmed by the three- 
caste census data and the random sample from i t .  Females' access to all 
labor opportunities except daily rated agricultural labor is influenced by 
caste. 
Members of three castes were inteniewcd particularly intensively in 
Aurepalle regarding their labor market participation. Kurmas are shepherds 
hy traditional occupation and are Hindus of low caste mnk. Malas are 
ex-untouchables whose traditional occupation is agricultural labor. Madigas 
are leatherworkers by traditional occupation, and therefore are also ex- 
untouchahles. Their traditional trade has declined due to availability of 
industrially produced leather goods or substitutes for leather goods. 
Among uorking males the frequency of partici ation in the irregular 
market ant1 the frequency of self-employment (othe than as a shepherd) 9 
are about I he same for the Mala and Kurma castes combined. compared 
with the Madigas.Only Kurmaswork as shepherds; thd RFSs come primarily 
from the Madiga caste-41 percent of all Madiga male$ currently work as 
RFSs. 
Table 8.6A shows the kinds of work done by those malts in the three- 
caste random sample who do not work as RFSs. Clearly. the Kurmas and 
Mnlaa have much better access than the Madigas to higher paid contract 
jobs (primarily well digging or well deepening for farmcrs-no government 

contracts are involved). 'The average number of hours \vorkcd per dny in all 
types of jobs i s  nearly the same (although work intensity mny differ). The 
better access to contract jobs results in substnntinlly hieher average dnily 
wages for the Malns and Kurmas compared with the Madigas, which i s  
stntistici~lly sigriific;trit. Notc that for femalcs, the waRc mtc dill'crcnc~s arc 
much st~laller but are st i l l  significantly dimerent. The wage dilTerence may 
be attributed in part to the better a m s s  tocontract jobs for Mala and Kurma 
women via their male family members. 
l'he maill settlement of Aurepallc presently (January-hfarch 1980) has 
four groups of contract workers, all engaged in dipging wells. The core 
membership of these groups is stable but additional workers are hired as 
ncccssary. Three of thc groups have mixed caste membership--Malas, 
Kurmas, Bogatna (dancers),' Mangali (barbers), Chakali (washermen) or 
Telaga (cultivators).--but they do not include a sinele Madip mcrnkr. The 
fourtlr group comprises exclusively Mndiga members. 
From the interviews with panel members and special informants, we 
found that Madigas are socially quite low in this village. where they are 
known as weak, lazy, and untrustworthy. This reputation i s  backed up by 
stories that are gross exaggerations. Twenty Madiga households received 
forty milk bulTalo from government programs with credit provided two years 
ago, for example. Several informants claimed that a l l  these buffalo were 
sold and the funds used for consumption purposes. However, of the twenty 
firnrilics, seventeen s t i l l  have one buliklo and one family has two. Interest- 
inply. the Madigas occasionally described themselves in thc same terrns and 
showed signs of insecurity during the interviews. Given this alleged lack 
of reliability, i t  i s  most astonishing to find them concentrated in the RFS 
jobs. which require regular work attendance and skills in handling of the 
bullocks. Furtherniore, these relationships are based on trust in that they 
involve debt and present opportunities to steal crop outputs and other things 
from employers. Malas are also ex-untouchables but arc reputed to be 
trustworthy and hardworking; a certain self-confidence was clearly reflected 
in their behavior during interviews. Their social status is  much more com- 
parahlc to that of the K urmas and other poorcaste groups than to that'of 
the Matligi~s. 111 thc first round of intcrvicwa with pancl mcmhcrcl and qpccial 
informittlts, thc Mnlnqand I~igh-caste respondents told us that Malaa virtually 
rlcvcr wc,rk rls 1 t l . S ~  tint1 tI,;11 l l~cy 00 vir~urlly rll of IIIC ~~l~yhic;tlly hartl 
conlrilct work. f)rtly thc tl~rec-agtc etlwa rcvcalctl thc Ji5turtion of reality 
in thcsc statements (stc tablc 8.61J). hut they clearly indicatc an ideology 
that appears to be useful both to the hightaste groups in fixing wages for 
RFSs and to the Malas and other caste groups in the competition for 
contract work. 
Unlike the situation in all other villa~cs, the RFS relationship in 
Aunpalle sometimes extends to the wife or another female member of the 
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RFS household, who performs the duty of outside sweeper and/or calls the 
female daily rated laborers for the husband's employer, for whom she there- 
fore works whenever the farmer has work at the same rate received by other 
female laborers. For the calling of laborers and the outside sweeping shc 
gets the equivalent of Rs 24-36/year in the form of various crop outputs 
and sometimes a sari. Whether or not the female member of the family 
does perform these duties appears to depend on mutual convenience--no 
special value is attached to these opportunities. 
Even more than in the other regions, RFSs in Aurepalle enter this 
relationship because of their need for loans. In the panel orily one family 
that ever had a permanent servant had not taken a loan from the employer. 
A large part of the loan demand arises from ceremonial expenses related to 
mamage, although consumption loans and medically related loans are also 
common. Male Madigos at the present time typically spend Rs 1,000 for 
their marriages, much of it raised as loans from their enlployers. Thcy 
normally pay 18 percent interest to their employers for these loans, which 
is deducted from their wages. 
Table 8.4 shows the other normal wage conditions. Wages in Aurepalle 
are completely paid in kind and the total monthly cash equivalent of these 
wages is currently Rs 43 per month for the panel (valued at 1975--76 prices), 
the lowest of any village. I t  takes the RFSs on average 5.8 years to pay back 
the debts, at which time these laborers enter the daily wage tnarket again. 
(They will usually not return to the RFS status unless compelled to by the 
need for a loan or by physical weakness-and then they beconle watchmen.) 
Most of this time is spent with the same employer, although i t  is possible to 
change employers if the second employer is willing to buy ofl the loan from 
the first. Farmers can refinance these loans by borrowing from rnoneylenders 
at 18 percent interest. 
Regression equations were fitted to the twcnt y-scvcn ol>servations of 
RFS wages using the following variables: I NTRATE = inlerest rate on 
loans; AGE = age in years; YRSASRFS = years of experience as regular 
farm servant; COWHERD = cowherd dummy; KURMALA = dummy 
variable for Kurmas alld Malas. (An F test indicated that separate dummy 
variables for Kurmas and Malas are not required, which is consistent with 
their otherwise nearly equal social standing.) The following three variables 
were also tried but were eliminated after an F test showed that jointly they 
did not add to the explanatory power of the regression : age squared, amount 
of loan outstanding, and a dummy variable indicating whether a female 
member of the household of the RFS was working as outside sweeper for 
the employer of the RFS. The final r e g d o n  is as follows (standard errors 
are in parentheses and * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively) : 
h h r  R t k i ~ i c ~ t r r  ir  1/11, Sc~ttr ic~rit l  r r t y i ~ ~ s  ltrtlic~ 
WAGEIMONTH = 52.0 - 0.88 INTRATE* + 0.19 AGE 
(.43) (.I61 
-0.11 YRSASRFS - 22.54 COWi1ERD" 
(.41) (2.82) 
+ 4.31 KURMALA'. 
(2.37) 
The regression equation indicates that personal charncteristics such as 
age and experience have little influence on the wage received and that the 
most massive \vilge differ,ences arc associated with the type of job done 
(cowherd or plowmen). The regression further shows that Kurmas and 
Malas are slightly favored over the Madigar in wsge pnpments, which i s  
consistent uith thc filldings in table 8.6A. although the percentage difference 
in RFS wages i s  small compared with that in daily wades. The interest rate 
variable shows that the few favored individuals who phy low interest rates 
also enjoy other wage benefits. Over 80 percent of the varintion in wage 
conditions i s  explained by this regression. Although nothirlg in i t  clearly 
supports or contradicts the effectiveness of wage fixing. the fact that pcr- 
sonal characteristics have l i t t l e  to do with the wapc reccited i s  consistent 
with i t .  
Although ttlcre are individual variations in wage conditions, the wage 
fixing i s  perceived by both farmers and laborers as effective. For fifteen 
years prior to 1977 the agreed-upon wnge was lixed at roughly 36 kg of 
paddy with 24 percent interest on loans. A oneday strike in 1977 organized 
by the Madigas enabled them to push the base condition to close to 45 kg 
and I R percoi t interests on loans. but a second strike in 1978 was ineffective. 
The f i x i t y  of t l le  wage in kind for RF7Ss over many years i~ in sharp contrast 
to the fluctuations in the wages each year in the irregular labor market 
(see tn ble 9. I ) .  
7 he fixity of the wage in kind for permanent servants otrtiously shins 
al l  the price risk of the labor contrast to the farmer. Git tn  the low wages. 
laborers are probably quite interested in shifting a l l  the price risk to the 
farmer and farmers are probably able to carry that risk relnti\*ely easilj. 
At the present time, workers a n  grumbling that they tvould prefer cash 
wages because paddy prices are low. However, at the beginning of the V1.S 
in 1975, we understood that workers preferred wage in kind when paddy 
prices were high. 
Table 8.4 shows that in Aurepalle, unlike the other villa~cs, RFS wages 
are substantinlly below the Ryan-Ghodake monthly wage quivalent. We 
will return to this point in the last section, after discussing Dokur. 
Mahbubnagar District: Dokur 
The main differences between Aurepalle and Dokur are as follows. (I) Lnbor 
demand and incomes are much higher in Dokur, as alreitdy discussed. 
(2) All caste groups participate in the hired labor markets, and only the two 
highest caste groups have never had any RFSs among their fatrllily members. 
(3) The large majority of panel members who were ever Rl:Ss started as 
herdsmen between the ages of ten and fifteen years, and among those 
currently serving as RFSs there are only a few plowmen. (Indeed, to collect 
the wage information for plowmen in table 8.4, we had to go outside the 
panel households.) 
We attribute the low number of plowmen to the superior earnings 
opportunities available as a result of temporary migration, which apparently 
has begun since the early 1950s. There is an extensive network of labor 
subcontractors in the Dokur area that recruits labor for thcse projects hy 
advancing amounts of from Rs 200 to a maximum of Rs 1,000 to individuals 
or to units, each made up of a man and his wife, who agree to work for the 
subcontractor on large government projects for five to eight months. Sub- 
contractors are usually family members of large and medium farmers from 
Dokur and surrounding villages, and they sometimes gather up to seventy 
laborers at one time. The advances are financed partly orlt of'the suh- 
contractors' own funds, but most of the money is obtained from the con- 
tractors who deal with the government. The projects are often quite far from 
Dokur; the most distant one we encountered was a railway project in 
Madhya Pradesh. Wages for both males arid females working on thesc 
projects range from Rs 75 to Rs 100/month, plus two meals per day plus 
shelter at the work site. The monthly cash wage is applied against the 
advance, although workers can further borrow small amounts of Rs 10-50 
from the subcontractor while on the job. Medical costs, if provided, arc 
adjusted in full against the worker's salary. 
I t  is clear from our investigation and from the consistent statements ol 
the workers themselves that the demand for advances is the primary motive 
for p~rticiption in this system. Table 8.7 shows Ihat the houschaltls tllnt 
providc Rl:Ss crrc virtually !he mmc as Ihosc which wntl out tcall~or~rty 
tnigrrrnts. I t  tltus appcars that thc typical history of an indi\.idu:~l i r ~  tlicsi* 
families it first to work as a herdsman between the ages of tcn and liftccn. 
serving up to the age of sixteen or eighteen, and then to begin daily farm 
labor supplemented by temporary migration to obtain project work during 
the dry season. The availability of advances from project work obviates 
the need for marriage loans from employers of the RFSs: in table 8.2, 
column 7, there are only t h m  ruch casts out of twenty-four. Furthermore, 
in sewn out of twenty-four casts, RFSs in Dokur did not take any loans 
from their employen. 

I t  is not clear whether Dokur ever had as poor conditions for RFSs as 
were observed in Aurepalle, but the similarities of the social structure and 
the agroclirnate, as well as the proximity of the villages to each other, suggest 
that the situations may have been the same. The additional flexibility and 
opportunity to work and to take advances tnadc possihlc hy temporary 
migration appear to have transformed labor relations to a degree in Dokur, 
in favor of the laborers. Large farmers and high-caste farmers have also 
responded to thc improved labor market opportunities by participating 
much more actively than their Aurepalle colleagues. 
INTERPRETATION A N D  IfYPOTllESES 
In this section we interpret the evidence presented in this paper, placing 
special emphasis on the observed differences in thc contract and RFS 
submarkets. Clearly, since we have only six villages, many of our inter- 
pretations cannot be verified statistically, and since they ale based upon 
many exogenous variables, alternative interpretations are possible. How- 
ever, our interpretations have to be evaluated in conjunction with the many 
pieces of evidence presented in this paper as well as in the two companion 
papers on the same villages included in this volume (see chapter 5 and 9). 
Importance of the Amount and Alternative Sources of b h o r  1)cmand 
The presence or absence of substantial labor demand influences conditions 
in all submarkets. In Akola steady agricultural labor demand and demand 
from nearby government projects combine to put laborers in a nlprior 
bargaining position that is reflected in high w a p  and high incomes in all 
submarkcts. Annual contracts have given way to shorter corltrilcts, which 
enable laborers to shift to the submarket with tlie most attractive terms in 
the course of the year. Furthermore, we believe that this steatfy demand has 
led to substantial erosion of the role of caste in controlling nccess to lahor 
opportunities, although sexual diflerentiation has been fully maintained here 
as elsewhere. We think that the operating factor here has bccn the growth 
of an agroeconomic environment in which thcre is steady demand for lahor 
from a variety of alternative sources. Moreover, we feel that the Maharashtra 
State government's Guaranteed Employment Program has been instrntnental 
in the consolidation of these gains in the conditions of rural labor, providing 
an important rrddition to the labor demand that begnn at least a hundred 
years ago to grow with the greatly increasing importance of'cotton in thc 
area. 
In the Sholapur district, alternative labor opportunities have existed 
for a long time, as we noted earlier in our discussion of the growth of Shalapur 
city as a mill town and of the long history of drought relief works in that 
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area. Evcn tlrouglr they are less well olT than their Akola counterparts. 
laborers in Slrolapur s t i l l  enjoy fairly favorable conditions. Also, the recent 
intensification of government projects seems to have led to a decrease in 
the importance of RFS relationships and to have made them looser. 
Although Llokur hns neither nearby government projlrts nor tin urhnn 
labor demand, the strong labor demand coming from irripntion, in combina- 
tion with the opportunities to migrate, results in fairly substantial labor 
incott~cs. Thc migration opportunities provide an al~ernative ~(rurce of lonns 
and employment to the RFS relationship and this employnient has virtunlly 
replaced RFS work for adult males. Such beneficial effect on the labor market 
where migrants originate must be kept in mind when interpreting the bleak 
conditions that tlic tetnporary migrants may face at their locations of work 
and that are so well documented in Breman's paper (chapter 7). In important 
ways both thc migrants nnd those whom they have left behind nre hetter off. 
Monopsony and Caste Competition in Aurepalle 
Laborers in Aurcpalle are penalized in a l l  submarkets for the low level of 
labor demand from local agriculture and the absence of other opportunities. 
I t  i s  this absetlce of' other local or more distant opportunities combined with 
the strong tri~ditional caste system that appears to enable farmers to exercise 
monopsony control in at least the market for plowmen. This i s  the only 
village in which payments to plowmen fall substantially shorr of the Ryan . 
Ghodakc monthly wage equivalent. and this shortfall may be interpreted 
as a monopsony rent. 
For the tnonopsony hypothesis to hold. i t  i s  quite immaterial whether 
workers respond to the low wages offered in the submarket for plowmen hy 
selecting thctnsclves into these positions i f  they find them attractive relative 
to other opportunities. The RFSs may indeed be the physically weaker 
members of the labor force although the skill requirements are probahly 
higher for these positions than for the more lucrative earth-digging cnntmct 
jobs. (This statement i s  consistent with the higher wages received by plowmen 
in other areas relative to the Ryan-Ghodake monthly wage equivalent.) 
Selection i s  simply a response on the labor supply side to the conditions 
offered on the demand side, and whether thew offers are low because of 
collusion or f'or other reasons i s  quite immaterial for the interpretation of 
these supply-rela red phenomena. 
f-urthermore. we believe that self-selection alonc could not account I'or 
the very low wages of plowmen in Aurepalle. Personal characteristics such 
as age and experience fail to have a statistically significatrt effect on plow- 
men's wages whereas caste does. Access to the more lucrative contract work 
opportunities is  also caste related. 
In further support of the monopsony hypothesis one needs to take into 
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account the caste-related ideological superstructure used to justify the low 
wages. Sincc the majority of RFSs come from the allegedly weak, lazy. and 
unreliable Madiga group their "low productivity justifies the low wages" 
in the eyes of the villagers. Ideology seems to be used as a means to support 
farmer's control over this group of laborers although, as mentioned before. 
the ideology is at best a massive exaggeration. 
But why do RFSs from the Madiga and other low-caste groups go into 
so much debt for marriage when they have such a hard time paying it back 
and clearly dislike the RFS status? (They usually do not return to i t  unless 
forced to by misfortune.) The most likely reason is the necessity---frequently 
stressed by respondents when pressed on this issue--to validate themselves 
relative to their own caste group. Since access to many labor opportunities 
is indeed influenced substantially by caste, and since other economic oppor- 
tunities are also caste related,' expenditures on marriage for validation 
purposes may well be a rational investment decision, apart from the social 
benefits of being a well-respected member of one's caste. 
In Aurepalle intercaste competition for contract jobs also seems to exist 
and suggests an interest on the part of the Malas as well a$ on the part or 
the high castes in supporting the local ideology of the inferior Mndiga. This 
could be so despite the fact that Malas suffer from the samc untoucliahility 
restrictions as Madigas. These restrictions still prevent them from taking 
water from wells of caste Hindus, continue to I'orce them to stand in their 
presence and to give high-caste members other marks of respect. arid prevent 
them from performing RI:S duties that require inside work. 
Labor Market Segmentation 
Throughout this paper we have avoided using thc term "lahor tnarkct 
segmentation." An operationally meaningrill definition ol' segmcn tat ion 
must imply that ( 1 )  the scgments of the market include distinctly differen1 
groups of individuals differentiated by such cllaracteristics as  caste, sex, age, 
wealth, or education, attd (2) the individuals can move from one scgtiic-nt 
to another only with substantial difficulty. If  individuals are not essentii~lly 
immobile het ween the submarkets that form the different segments. wagcs 
in the submarkets will vary to compensate for differences in employment 
conditions such as hours of work, intensity of work, or skill recluircmcntl;. 
Furthermore, if the groups in the segments are not identifiable by clear-c~~t 
characteristics or arc mobile betwan submarkets, segment:\ tion may hurt  
some individuals relative to others, but it will not penalize or benefit entire 
socioeconomic groups (and possibly, as a result, this will call for policy 
intervention on behalf of the spec if^ groups). 
7. Mrdi$aq. for cxrmpk, haw ban uclusivc hcmrkiarica of a povcmment hnusina 
scheme rnd r bullilo distribution aherne in Aurqmlk. 
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Ikfined in this way, segmentation is virtually absent in the male sub- 
markets in all villages except possibly Aurepalle. Participation in all suh- 
markets is too broad-based and mobility among them is too high to consider 
them segments. Even in Aurepalle one may not want to use the term "market 
segment" to refer to the male RFS subniarket and the ttiarkct for contract 
jobs. The RFS submarket includes primarily poor young males. but virtually 
all of them leave that submarket before they reach the age of thirty. although 
often with great difficulty. Madigas predominate in this submarket, but 
other caste groups also participate in i t ,  so i t  cannot be termed a caste-based 
scgnlent in arry case. The market for contract jobs is accessible by members 
of all castes. although Madigas may have niore difTiculty in entering it. But 
it  is clearly not n segment since there is substantial mobility between this 
submarket and the daily rated submarkct. 
On the other hand. onecan clearly seedistinct male and female segments 
in the markets in all villages. The male segnients arc generally not accessible 
to the females with very .few exceptions, such as some of the harvesting 
operations and some of the earth-digging contract jobs. Even in thcx  earth- 
digging jobs the wotnen generally do difTerent tasks than the inen: in all 
villages (with the exception of Shirapur) they have access to such jobs only 
via their male fatilily inemhers. In the regular submarket, as discussed earlier. 
females are also excluded from the submarket for plowmen and herdsmen. 
(Only one woman was observed watching crops.) The wntnen are restricted 
to the few domestic servant jobs available. 
Males, of course, cannot generally move into women's jobs eithcr, 
except for some elderly men or young children who pnrticipatc in hand 
weeding. or  hoys who work as inside servants. But mnles \vould hardly desire 
to p:~rticipa~e in the female submarkets. Male wages (atijusted for hours 
worked) in the irreglilar markets of these villages are rt*uplrly 80 percent 
higher than fetnnle wages. Male probabilities of cmployrncnt are niuch 
higher as well (see Ryan. Ghodake, and Sarin, table 3). $egnrentation clearly 
works in Rvor nf the mnles and at the expense of the f{n~nlo. 
Ideological support for this segmentation is strong. A taboo prevcnts 
wonicn frotn touching the plow and, as in other socictics, males who do 
domestic chores or  other female-specific tasks are ridicbled. Low wages for 
women are attributed.-.-by both males and females- -to the lack of physical 
strength and slatninii of women. One need only see the loads carried by 
thcm and the discipline evident in the paddy transplanting lines to  realize 
that the large observed wage differentials can hardly he explained in this 
way. 
Tied Transactions 
Tied transactions as a means by which the more powerful extract favorable 
terms for tlicmselm in transactions with poorer partners have become a 
topic of' speculation (Bhrrdwaj 1 9 7 6 ;  B h d u t i  1973) m d  have mom 
recently become Lhe focur of e m p i r i d  invat ip t ion  (Rudm 197Su, 6; 
Bardhan and Rudm 1978). 
In all vill.gu,'hborcredit links arc restricted to RFS contracts. They 
provide poor pcopk with ur opportunity to  raise credit t b t  would ofkm 
be totally lacking. In Akola they are of' such short duratioo that they am 
probably to be interpreted u k i n g  of'mutual beMZit in most caber. Although 
the contracts are of' longer duration in Sholapur, t hd r  term d o  not a p p e u  
to be substantially below thole a n i l a b k  in other submarkcts. Only in 
Aurepelle arc terms of' d i t l n k e d  RFS contracts J u r l y  inferior. But 
we believe that it is not primarily the tying that puts the laborers at  a d i e  
advantage. but the efloctive collusion of' f 'armm in tbe absence of alternative 
sources of' labor demand. Without collusion o r  other f 'om of' monopsony 
or monopoly power, the t e r m  of' tied transactions may thus rcCkct "com- 
petitive" market conditions of supply and demand without an additional 
extraction of "rents" to the "stron@r" partner. In thb  paper we have round 
little evidence that tied transactions in a submarket cannot be understood 
by a supply and demand framework Tor this type of' t m m c h n .  Tndit ioml 
analysis of' market imperfections such as monopsony, monopoly, collusion. 
and restrictions to mobility can then be u d  to explain unequal o r  exploita- 
tive terms in regions or villages where the imperfections a n  k documented 
empirically. 
Labor Market Behavior i n  Rural Villages 
" ,# 1 .I 
in South India: Effects of Season, Sex, 
and Socioeconomic Status 
James G. &im ;md R. D. Ghodake 
Most dewloping countria of' the miarid tropics (SAT), particularly in 
Asia, have a relative abundance of labor mourccl in proportion to apital 
and land. Statisti# on thir apparent abundance m wurlly only rnilabk 
(if at all) in t e r m  of nalionrl or r + m a l  annual aggregates, as pointed out 
recently by McDiumid (1977). Bardhn (1977), and ~ r m k n  and Jam 
(1977). Even them rblidicr us onen not nlirbk, prrlicularly for lhe run1 
areas. Probkm of nuwrl unernploymtnl an most acute in rural areas, 
as m k d  in the comprrhearivc study of Rudn and Bisws (1973). 1; is  
imperative to deriw mom w a n t s  meuura and a ktttr understuding of 
the demand and supply prnmttcn of hbor mrkcb, particularly in India, 
where 70 p e m l  of the hbor form ir durirwd u agdcultunl workers. 
T h i s  paper npnrenb an attempt to bridge romc of the gap in our 
knowledge. Jt is an larlysin of the labor market behavior of 240 labor and 
cultivator hour;eholdr in six umiuid tropical villager in the Mahrnrhtm 
and Andhm Pnderb rtrter of muth ldia, r region that hao larply been 
neglected in this fuld of rwmrch. Tbc data Tor this study were drawn from 
six villr~a in'tbe SAT of pcnlnrulu India, where inlcnuvz socioeconomic 
studies have kta conducrd continuously uncu May 1975 as part of the 
ICRJSAT economics program1 Details oT the labor utilization of each 
family member and of hired penonncl'mn obtained. Thew data rrlattd 
to both on-firm and dt-farm activities u well as to hotrsehold use.' 
I .  
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